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Title:	Predictable Task Switching: Manipulations of Preparation Interval and Preparation-interval Variability, 2018-2020
Keywords:	PSYCHOLOGY COGNITIVE PROCESSES 2021
Description:	When more than one task has to be performed within a block of trials, a cost of switching relative to repeating tasks (a “switch cost”) is usually seen following completed trials (i.e., trials where the task was executed). In studies where completed trials involve making a response such as a button press, and where tasks are sequenced predictably (in alternating runs), that switch cost has tended to be overcome with just one instance of task-execution. In Experiment 1, we wished to see whether a switch cost that was overcome after just one trial of a new task-run would also be present following other types of trial: i) completed trials involving a nogo response (i.e., where not pressing the button is the appropriate response, such as where the task rule requires that the button not be pressed for even numbers); ii) cue-only trials, where a task cue but no target is presented, such that the prepared task cannot be performed. This experiment involved a single cue-type (colour cues), a fixed preparation (cue-target) interval and a fixed trial length. Because there was no way of knowing that participants had prepared the cued task before target onset in that first experiment, we explored in Experiment 2 whether we could observe pre-target task preparation by manipulating the preparation interval. This experiment included only completed trials, and it manipulated cue-type (between blocks; verbal or image), preparation interval (within participants) and whether preparation interval was varied between blocks or between trials (between participants). In Experiment 3, we used the between-trials method of varying preparation interval and image cues from Experiment 2, and we re-introduced cue-only trials.<p>GRANT ABSTRACT: In this project we will investigate whether what we "know" and what we "do" have different effects on our subsequent behaviour. We will do this by looking at our ability to switch between different tasks. Specifically, we will compare how difficult it is to switch away from a task that we have either: a) only prepared to perform (we "knew" what the relevant task was but we didn't "do" it), or ii) actually performed (we both "knew" it and "did" it). In our everyday lives we frequently need to switch between the different rules that guide our behaviour. For instance, when driving a car we might switch rapidly between the following “tasks”: visually assessing potential hazards at a junction; accelerating past a tractor; performing an emergency stop. From studies using laboratory tasks, we know that switching tasks usually leads to slowed responses, and that we occasionally even repeat the previous task in error. The existence of this “switch cost” reveals that some aspect of the previous task must persist in some way to affect the speed or accuracy of our subsequent behaviour, even though we know that it is no longer relevant. In this project, we wish to find out about what causes this cost of switching between tasks. Our main question concerns whether just preparing a task ("knowing") will have different consequences from actually performing it ("doing"). There are various examples in psychology of situations where what we know has surprisingly little impact upon what we do. For instance, we can sometimes verbally repeat instructions given to us, and demonstrate that we understand and remember them, but then fail to implement them at all (a phenomenon known as “goal neglect”). A similar distinction has been drawn in task-switching research. It had been thought that doing a task would produce a subsequent switch cost, but that knowing which task should be performed without actually carrying it out would produce no subsequent cost. However, more recent evidence using a different method suggests that merely preparing a task can in fact produce a substantial switch cost, even if the prepared task was not performed. We will conduct a series of psychological experiments in which people perform two different tasks. For instance, we will show them coloured shapes (like a blue circle) and ask them to press a button to indicate either what the colour is or what the shape is. By intermixing the two tasks randomly, we will be able to assess people's ability to switch between tasks, relative to repeating tasks - that is, we can measure each person's switch cost. On most trials, people will prepare a task and then perform it: for instance, they may see the word “colour” and then a blue circle, at which point they press the appropriate button to indicate that the colour is blue. Crucially, however, on some trials we will require a task to be prepared but not performed: e.g., we may show the word “colour” but then no coloured shape, instead moving straight on to the next trial. Therefore, we will be able to measure the switch cost that follows preparation separately from the switch cost that follows performance. Across a series of experiments we aim to find out what causes these types of switch cost to be established and abolished, and in what ways the switch cost driven by preparation may differ from that driven by performance. The cost of switching tasks indicates a fundamental limitation in our cognitive system that is relevant to many situations (e.g., working in a busy office, driving in heavy traffic, preparing dinner while taking care of a baby). Understanding the mechanisms behind this limitation is of potential practical importance with respect to reducing risks associated with this cost. The present project will meet this challenge by illuminating the origin of this limitation.</p>
URI:	https://t2-4.bsc.es/jspui/handle/123456789/59698
Other Identifiers:	10.5255/UKDA-SN-854762 854762 https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-854762
Appears in Collections:	Cessda

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