Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game

Przepiorka, Wojtek; Przepiorka, Wojtek; Diekmann, Andreas; Diekmann, Andreas

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://t2-4.bsc.es/jspui/handle/123456789/72162

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Przepiorka, Wojtek	en
dc.creator	Przepiorka, Wojtek	de
dc.creator	Diekmann, Andreas	en
dc.creator	Diekmann, Andreas	de
dc.date	2023	en
dc.date.accessioned	2023-05-19T07:09:19Z	-
dc.date.available	2023-05-19T07:09:19Z	-
dc.identifier	10.7802/2558	-
dc.identifier	https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2558?lang=de	-
dc.identifier	https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2558?lang=en	-
dc.identifier.uri	https://t2-4.bsc.es/jspui/handle/123456789/72162	-
dc.identifier.uri	https://t2-4.bsc.es/jspui/handle/123456789/72162	*
dc.description	In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public.	en
dc.description	In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public.	de
dc.language	en	-
dc.subject	Kooperation	en
dc.subject	Gemeinwohl	en
dc.subject	Rückkopplung	en
dc.subject	Nachhaltigkeit	en
dc.subject	Laborexperiment	en
dc.subject	Kooperation	de
dc.subject	Gemeinwohl	de
dc.subject	Rückkopplung	de
dc.subject	Nachhaltigkeit	de
dc.subject	Laborexperiment	de
dc.title	Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game	en
dc.type	Dataset	en
dc.coverage	Schweiz	en
dc.coverage	Schweiz	de
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